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Fair Trial and Free Press: The ABA
Recommendations -A Defense
Lawyer's Viewpoint
Edward R. Brown
Mr. Brown quickly summarizes the process by which the ABA Com-
mittee reached its conclusions and discusses several of the more important
findings. Proceeding to a definitive examination of the proposed rem-
edies, the author concurs with the Committee that the existing devices
available to the defense in eliminating prejudice - change of venue, con-
tinuance, jury selection, and mistrial - should be invoked more fre-
quently and that the standards used to justify these remedies should be re-
duced. Mr. Brown also discusses the expansion of news blackouts and the
use of closed-door hearings and concludes with an analysis of the views ex-
pressed by those concerned with the Report as well as a delineation of
two problems raised by the Report.
Aw N THE WAKE of the Warren Commission recommendations
calling for the establishment of "ethical standards so that there
will be no interference with pending criminal investigations, court
proceedings, or the right of individuals to a fair trial,"1 a special ad-
visory committee was appointed
by the President of the Ameri-THE AUTHoR (A.B., Harvard Univer- can Bar Association to study
sity, LL.B., Western Reserve University)
is presently a staff attorney of the Legal and report upon the problem
Aid Defender's Office in Cuyahoga of fair trial and free press.
County, Ohio. This eleven-member commit-
tee included five judges, one ex-
judge, one law school dean, one ex-dean, and one ex-lawyer who
resigned to accept an appointment to the United States Supreme
Court.
Supported by money from private grants, the committee and
its staff labored for twenty months. On October 1, 1966, the com-
mittee released its 265-page report which included a barrage of
"tentative" recommendations. The report is the most exhaustive
study of fair trial and free press ever undertaken. The recommen-
dations for remedial measures are generally conservative in that
most have been recommended or adopted before, but the measures
are innovative to the extent that new clothes have been placed on
old remedies.
'U.S. REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S CoMMIssIoN ON THE ASSASSINATION OF
PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY 27 (1964) [hereinafter cited as WARREN REPORT).
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L FINDINGS OF THE REPORT
The ABA Report includes a survey of all existing American
decisions concerning the effect of prejudicial news publicity upon
a fair trial as well as some English cases and a survey of most litera-
ture bearing on the subject. Moreover, the committee's staff studied
for one-month periods twenty daily newspapers in twenty different
large cities and sent questionnaires to judges, prosecutors, defense
counsel, police chiefs, and newspaper editors in these same
twenty communities. The committee staff also surveyed reports of
psychological studies and tests which were pertinent to the question
of what information can prejudice jurors.'
From this research and survey, the report concluded that the
number of cases involving potential prejudice is larger than gen-
erally assumed.3 For instance, in each of the twenty newspapers
surveyed, there were at least fifteen cases reported "in which the
nature, prominence, and timing of the news coverage raised the
most serious questions of potential prejudice."4  Between January
1963 and March 1965, there were one-hundred judicial decisions
in which the issue of prejudicial publicity affecting a convicted de-
fendant's right to a fair trial was raised. While few decisions re-
sulted in reversal or mistrial, the ABA Report added that "a study
of these decisions suggests that this may have been largely due to
an excessive deference to the discretion of the trial judge, not to a
lack of merit in the claim being made."5  Moreover, the report
noted that appellate decisions represented but the top of the ice-
berg and that responses to questionnaires sent to defense counsel
indicated a much higher incidence of potential prejudice at the trial
level.6
Necessarily, the Report defines its conclusions in terms of poten-
tial prejudice rather than actual prejudice, and to that extent these
conclusions are based on inference and conjecture. The tools of
social science research in this area are limited. Even the ultimate
standard against which such research is conducted - the concept
of fair trial - does not lend itself to any precise definition or meas-
urement. Accordingly, although the evidence marshalled in the
2 ABA PRoJEcT ON MnqMuM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTIcE: STANDARDS
RELATING TO FAiR TRIAL & FREE PRESS 23-24 (Tent. Draft 1966) [hereinafter cited
as ABA REPORT].
8 Id. at 24.
4Ibid.
5 Id. at 23 (commentary).
6 Id. at 23-24 (commentary).
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ABA Report is impressive, this alone does not serve as a categorical
refutation of the oft-made charge: "The presumption of some mem-
bers of the Bar that pretrial news is intrinsically prejudicial is based
on conjecture and not on fact."'  Another significant conclusion,
that an individual juror's exposure to outside information may af-
fect him below the level of the conscious mind so that he may thus
be unaware that he has been affected and may be unable to express
any conscious prejudice,' was based upon studies in the field of
opinion research and studies of jurors' decisions in mock cases.9 In
the mock cases jurors were exposed to prejudicial matters in varying
degrees and their verdict proportionately reflected the degree of
exposure."0 In another interesting experiment a class of students
was asked to rate a guest lecturer, and their ratings were shown to
have been influenced by the different descriptions of the lecturer
appearing in a biographical circular distributed before the lecture."
II. REMEDIAL MEASURES PROPOSED
To meet the problem of potential publicity affecting a- fair trial,
the committee considered three possible remedies:
(1) direct restrictions on the news media, through increased use
of the contempt power or specific statutory prohibitions; (2) ex-
pansion of remedies and preventive techniques available to a de-
fendant who complains of potentially prejudicial news coverage;
and (3) restrictions on the release of certain kinds of information
and opinions for carefully defined periods by lawyers and law en-
forcement officers participating in the criminal process.12
Generally, the committee looked to the second and third remedies,
rejecting the remedy of direct restrictions upon the press except in
the two limited situations which will be considered later. 3
A. Expansion of Remedies and Preventive Techniques
Available to a Defendant
The Report concluded what common experience suggests,
7 REPORT OF THE AMERICAN NEWSPAPER PUBLISHERS AssocIATIoN SPECIAL
COMMTTBE ON FREE PREss AND FAIR TIAL 1 (1967) [hereinafter cited as ANPA
REPORT].
8 ABA REPoRT 61 (commentary).
9 Id. at 62-65 (commentary).
10 Id. at 62.
11 Id. at 63.
12 Id. at 68.
13 See text accompanying notes 31-45 in ra.
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namely, that "the overwhelming proportion of potentially prejudi-
cial information or comment appearing in the media is adverse to
the defendant."' 4 The remedial measures recommended first looked
to the traditional techniques which primarily benefit the defense:
continuance, change of venue, challenge for cause of a prospective
juror, sequestration of the jury during trial, questioning during the
trial individual jurors who, are exposed to publicity during that
period, court admonitions that jurors avoid the mass media during
trial, and mistrial.'5 While these techniques have long been avail-
able, trial courts have been reluctant to invoke them at the request
of the defense.'" Indeed, in the first Sheppard trial, the judge in-
voked only a few of them, and this was sharply criticized by the
United States Supreme Court ten years later.'
The innovations which the committee's recommendations af-
ford to these traditional techniques are threefold: (1) when certain
conditions are shown to exist by the defense, the court must, if re-
quested, utilize one or more of these techniques; (2) the conditions
requiring resort to any given technique fall short of a showing of
actual prejudice by the defense; (3) the defense is protected if it
requests the court to invoke any of these techniques.
For example, during the jury selection process, the defense may
request that an examination of each individual be conducted out-
side the presence of other jurors, either prospective or selected, and
the defense's request must be granted "whenever there is believed
to be a significant possibility that individual talesmen will be in-
eligible to serve because of exposure to potentially prejudicial ma-
terial ... .""s This simple device carries two benefits for the de-
fense. First, defense counsel can pry and probe into the extent of
the prospective juror's pre-trial exposure without fear of eliciting
information which might affect other jurors already seated" and
14 ABA REPORT 73.
15 Id. at 73-74.
16 Sequestration of the jury during the second trial of Sam Sheppard was the first
time in recent memory that a jury had been sequestered during a criminal trial in Cuya-
hoga County. Cleveland Plain Dealer, Nov. 1, 1966, p. 1, col. 3.
'7 Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 357, 363 (1966).
Is ABA REPORT 10 (Standard 3.4 (a)).
19 Even the most basic question may evoke a prejudicial answer. As reported of
the voir dire before the trial of Dick Hickok and Perry Smith for the mass murder of
the Cutter family:
During the voir dire . . . the airport employee, a middle age man named
N.L Dunnan, said, when asked his opinion of capital punishment, 'Ordi-
narily I'm against it. But in this case, no' - a declaration -which to some
196,J 1159
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without fear of antagonizing those jurors or the individual being ex-
amined. Second, if defense counsel believes that his extensive ques-
tioning has antagonized this individual, at least he can exercise one
of his few peremptory challenges without concern as to its effect
upon jurors already seated. Thus, the stage is set for a thorough,
uninhibited voir dire examination.
Under the recommended standards the emphasis is more upon
the degree of an individual juror's exposure to pre-trial publicity
than upon persuading him to admit to an opinion which he cannot
put aside. If the prospective juror admits to an opinion on the
merits, "he shall be subject to challenge for cause unless the exam-
ination shows unequivocally that he can be impartial."2  Formerly,
the defense was usually required to show unequivocally that the
prospective juror could not be impartial.21 Massive exposure re-
quires dismissal for cause "without regard to his [the juror's] testi-
mony as to his state of mind."' 2 Thus, under the ABA's recom-
mended standards, the defense is not faced with the usually insur-
mountable task of establishing prejudice from a prospective juror's
own lips and at the same time avoiding the alienation of the entire
panel for his efforts.
Similar procedures are to be utilized for questioning jurors who
have not been sequestered and who may possibly have been exposed
to prejudicial materials during the trial.23 When the defense does
successfully request sequestration upon a showing that "the case is
of such notoriety or the issues are of such a nature that, in the ab-
sence of sequestration, highly prejudicial matters are likely to come
to the attention of the jurors,"24 the court may not reveal which
party requested sequestration." Again the defense is protected
from the risk of antagonizing a much-inconvenienced jury.
Motions for change of venue and for continuance must be
granted upon a showing that "because of the dissemination of po-
tentially prejudicial material, there is a reasonable likelihood that
who heard it, seemed clearly indicative of prejudice. Dunnaa was neverthe-
less accepted as a juror. CAPOTE, IN COLD BLOOD 273 (1965).
Capote does not state before how many other jurors this remark was made.
20 ABA REPORT 11 (Standard 3.4(b)).
21 50 C.J.S. Juries § 277, at 1061 (1947).
22 ABA REPORT 11.
23 Id. at 13 (Standard 3.5 (f)). This procedure is already accepted practice in the
federal courts. See Marshall v. United States, 360 U.S. 310 (1959).
24 Id. at 42 (Standard 3.5 (c)).
25 Ibid.
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in the absence of such relief, a fair trial cannot be had."26 No show-
ing of actual prejudice is required.27 If upon the overruling of such
a motion the defense elects to waive a jury trial, the defense is not
precluded from raising on appeal the claim that the court erred in
overruling the motion.2" In this way defense counsel are spared
the dilemma of going to trial before a jury believed to be prejudiced
hoping to claim error on appeal, or else waiving a jury in favor of
a hopefully more impartial tribunal of one or more judges but waiv-
ing at the same time any right to appeal the denial of the motions
for change of venue and for continuance.29
B. Restrictions on the Release of Certain Kinds of Information
for Carefully Defined Periods-Before and During Trial
The Warren Commission Report sharply criticized both the
Dallas law enforcement officials and the press for releasing and
reporting certain information respecting the detention and investi-
gation of Lee Harvey Oswald. 0 While recognizing that a con-
cerned public had the right to know what agencies were participat-
ing in the investigation, that Oswald had been apprehended, and
that the state had sufficient evidence to charge Oswald with the
murders of President Kennedy and Patrolman Tippit, the report
added:
[Njeither the press nor the public had a right to be contempo-
raneously informed by the police or prosecuting authorities of
the details of the evidence being accumulated against Oswald....
The courtroom, not the newspaper or television screen, is the ap-
propriate forum in our system for the trial of a man accused of a
crime.31
Dean Erwin Griswold of .the Harvard Law School amplified
this theme in a now oft-quoted article originally appearing in the
Saturday Review. Dean Griswold recommended a complete black-
out on the pre-trial release of information by lawyers and law en-
261d. at 9 (Standard 3.2(c) ).
27 Id. at 9 (Standard 3.2(b) ). The standards liberalize methods of proof by per-
mitting opinion surveys and "other material having probative value."
28Id. at 9-10 (Standard 3.2(e)).
29 The writer two years ago participated in a first-degree murder trial at which a
motion for change of venue was made and later withdrawn when a jury trial was waived.
At the time it was thought that waiver of a jury trial was, in effect, a waiver of any
rights to change of venue; consequently, no issue of prejudicial publicity was raised on
appeal. See State v. White, 9 Ohio App. 2d 271, 224 N.F_.2d 377 (1967).
30 WARRER!PORT 231-42.
slid. at 240.
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forcement officers with the exception of the accused's identity and
the nature of the charge. 2 In addition Dean Griswold recom-
mended the use of the rule-making and contempt powers of the
courts to restrict pre-trial disclosures. 8
The New Jersey Supreme Court, in late 1964, interpolated the
core of the Griswold recommendations into Canons 5 and 20 of the
Canons of Professional Ethics and suggested sanctions against both
lawyers and law enforcement officials in the event of an unauthor-
ized pre-trial release of potentially prejudicial information. 4 How-
ever, the New Jersey court did not assert the manner in which disci-
pline should be imposed in the event of unauthorized disclosures by
the police - whether by invoking the contempt power of the courts
or otherwise.3"
Similarly, the United States Supreme Court in Sheppard v. Max-
well implied approval of the Griswold formula without clarifying
whether restrictions on unauthorized disclosures should be applied
during the entire period from arrest to verdict or only during actual
trial.3" Further, the Court avoided the problems inherent in the en-
forcement of such restrictions against law enforcement officers and
declined to suggest the use of the rule-making and contempt powers
of the courts.3
With respect to the blackout period and the extent of the black-
out, the ABA Committee's recommendations strike a middle ground.
The blackout period extends from the moment of arrest or the fil-
ing of the charge to the conclusion of trial.3 ' The extent of the
blackout before trial includes information as to defendant's crimi-
nal record; existence or contents of a confession or suspect's refusal
to submit to questioning or tests; information as to evidence un-
covered, including identity of witnesses or test results; opinions
32 Griswold, When Newsmen Become Newsmakers, Saturday Review, Oct. 24, 1964,
p. 21, at 23.
33 Ibid.
34 State v. Van Duyne, 43 N.J. 369, 204 A.2d 841 (1964).
351d. at 389, 204 A.2d at 852.
36 Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 361-62 (1966).
37 Ibid.
3 8 The ABA Report also recommends that law enforcement authorities promul-
gate regulations "governing the release of information, relating to the commission of
crimes and to their investigation, prior to the making of an arrest or the filing of formal
charges." ABA REPORT 7 (Standard 2.2(a)). Prosecutors are also restricted in com-
menting on matters pending grand jury investigation. Id. at 2 (Standard 1.1) (by
implication).
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about the merits of the case and characterizations of the defendant;
and information respecting plea negotiation.89
While the blackout on extra-judicial statements during trial is
to be complete,"' the recommended standards specifically authorize
the pre-trial release of factual information respecting the defend-
ant's employment, family, age, and residence. In addition the po-
lice or prosecutor, "if the defendant has not been apprehended, may
release any information necessary to aid in his apprehension or to
warn the public of any dangers he may present."'" Further, the
law enforcement officer or the lawyer for either the prosecution or
defense
may announce the circumstances of arrest, including the time and
place of arrest, resistance, pursuit, and use of weapons; may an-
nounce the identity of the investigating and arresting officer or
agency and the length of the investigation; may make an an-
nouncement, at the time of the seizure, describing any evidence
seized; may disclose the nature, substance, or text of the charge,
including a brief description of the offense charged; may quote
from or refer without comment to public records of the court in
the case; may announce the scheduling or result of any stage in the
judicial process; and may request assistance in obtaining evidence;
and, on behalf of his client, may announce without further com-
ment that the client denies the charges against him.1
If the ABA Committee recommendations respecting the extent
of information which may be disclosed before trial strike a middle
ground,48 the committee assumes a decisive position with respect to
the manner in which these restrictions are to be enforced. The
courts are urged to adopt these recommendations as rules of court.
Lawyers and law enforcement officers are to be subject to contempt
proceedings for violating the restrictions as well as being subject
to disciplinary action by bar associations and executive authorities
supervising police officials.44
39 Id. at 5-6 (Standard 2.1).
40 Id. at 4 (Standard 1.1). This blackout also applies to employees of the judiciary.
Id. at 7 (Standard 2.3).
41 Id. at 3, 5 (Standards 1.1 & 2.1).
42 Id. at 6 (Standard 2.1).
43 The United States Attorney General permits release by Justice Department offi-
cials of a defendanes record of federal convictions. See ATrORNEY GENERAL'S STATE-
MENT OF POLICY CONCERNING THE RELEASE OF INFORMATION BY PERSONNEL OF
TE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTIcE RELATING TO CRIMNAL PROCEEDINGS app. D.
In contrast, the ABA recommendations, like those of a special group of the New
York Bar Association and those of Dean Erwin Griswold, prohibit disclosure of any in-
formation pertaining to a criminal record. ABA REPORT 3, 5 (Standards 1.1(1) &
2.1(1)). See also MEDINA, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS AND FAIR TRIAL 32 (1967)
[hereinafter cited as MEDINA REPORT]; Griswold, supra note 32 and accompanying text.
44 ABA REPORT 5, 6 (Standards 3.1 & 2.1).
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The committee realistically recognized that restrictions on law-
yers alone were far from adequate and that if the restrictions were
to be effective at all, they must subject every individual to the same
sanctions."
C. Closed Hearings and Direct Restrictions on News Media
If there are to be restrictions on both lawyers and law enforce-
ment officers respecting pre-trial release of certain information,
necessarily there must be restrictions respecting the nature of pre-
trial hearings where this type of information is likely to be disclosed.
Magistrates and commissioners frequently do not apply strict rules
of evidence at preliminary hearings, which are not subject to re-
view. At bail hearings a defendant applying for a bail reduction
is sometimes characterized by prosecutors and police officers as a
"known burglar"46 or as a "dangerous killer."47  In such hearings,
of course, previous arrests or convictions may be relevant for pur-
poses of determining the amount of bail. At hearings on motions
to suppress evidence illegally seized, hearsay which would be inad-
missible at the trial itself is both relevant and proper for purposes
of deciding the motion." If information disclosed at such pre-trial
hearings were reported in the news media, the purpose of the pre-
trial restrictions on lawyers and law enforcement officers would
obviously be frustrated.
The ABA recommended standards afford the judicial officer
conducting the hearings and the news reporters attending the hear-
ings two options. At pre-trial hearings where a substantial likeli-
hood exists that evidence or argument inadmissible at trial may be
adduced and disseminated in the news media, thereby interfering
with a defendant's right to a fair trial by an impartial jury, the judi-
The exercise of contempt powers over law enforcement officers who violate rules
restricting disclosure probably represents the sharpest divergence between the recom-
mendations of the ABA Committee and the New York Bar (Medina) Committee. The
Medina Committee takes the position that courts are without power to discipline law
enforcement authorities for conduct occurring prior to trial. See material cited note
72 infra.
4 5 ABA REPORT 98 (commentary).
46 Transcript of bail reduction hearing, State v. Severino, No. 82743, Cuyahoga
County, Ohio C.P., July 28, 1965.
47 According to attorney F. Lee Bailey, during a bail hearing a Massachusetts dis-
trict attorney asserted that Bailey's client was "one of the real killers of the Common-
wealth." See Address by F. Lee Bailey, City Club Forum, Cleveland, Ohio, Nov. 26,
1966 (tape of Address in files of the Cleveland City Club).
48Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 267-72 (1960); Draper v. United States,
358 U.S. 307 (1959).
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cial officer must on motion of the defense or may, on his own mo-
don with the consent of the defendant, order such hearings to be
dosed to the public.49  On the other hand, the judicial officer may
obtain the agreement of news reporters to withhold publication of
such information until after completion of ,the trial or disposition
of the case or, in the alternative, issue an order to that effect, the
violation of which would constitute grounds for contempt.F° The
same procedures and standards apply to portions of a trial con-
ducted outside the jury's presence, but only if the jury has not been
sequestered."'
Recognizing the dangers attendant to closed hearings, and rec-
ognizing that there must be continuing public scrutiny of every
phase of the judicial process, the committee sought to establish a
safeguard." The recommended standards provide that whenever a
pre-trial hearing is conducted as a dosed hearing, "a complete record
of the proceedings shall be kept and shall be made available to the
public following the completion of trial or disposition of the case
without trial."' "s The same standard is recommended when there
is a hearing during the trial but outside the presence of a jury which
is not sequestered."
In addition to the carefully circumscribed contempt power de-
scribed above, the recommended standards purport to confer upon
the courts power to issue contempt citations against anyone - rep-
resentatives of the news media and spectators, as well as lawyers
and police - if, during a jury trial which he knows is in progress, he
4 9 ABA REPORT 8 (Standard 3.1).
50Id. at 15 (Standard 4.1(b)).
51 Id. at 12, 15 (Standards 3.5 (d) & 4.1 (b)). This optional procedure for dosed
hearings or temporarily restricting newspapers from publishing matters of public record
resulted from the response of the news media to questionnaires about this issue. As
stated in the commentary of the ABA Report:
The Committee's field research disclosed varying attitudes toward this
problem on the part of media representatives. Some, recognizing a right of
exclusion, would be content to have the same access to judicial proceedings as
the rest of the public but would insist on reporting any proceedings at which
they were present; others would oppose any exclusion of the media and state
that they would seek to report even hearings held in chambers; still others
would seek unrestricted access to proceedings but would ordinarily acquiesce
in a judge's request to withhold certain information. Id. at 143-44 (com-
mentary).
This latter alternative enabling reporters to monitor all hearings would seem pref-
erable to the news media which is concerned about secret trials and possible corruption
on the part of public officials.
521d. at 117 (commentary).
53 ld. at 8, 12 (Standards 3.1 & 3.5 (d)).
54Id. at 12 (Standard 3.5(d)).
116519671
WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
disseminates a statement through the news media, or makes a state-
ment expecting it to be so disseminated, about matters which are not
of public record and which are reasonably calculated to affect the
outcome of the trial.5
III. VIEWS OF THE REACTION TO THE PROPOSED
RECOMMENDATIONS
Within a week of its release thirteen of fourteen major news-
paper executives sharply criticized the ABA Report."s Judge
George C. Edwards, Jr. of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals was
quoted as terming the report "the most dangerous threat to the
American ideal of free speech and press since the days of Joe Mc-
Carthy."57  Early criticism persisted and prompted the committee
chairman to remark two months after release of the report: "This
report is not going to be smothered by overkill.""8  So far, the ma-
jor criticism has come from three sources: the police, members of
the bar, and the press.
A. The Police
The initial police response reflects uneasiness as to the courts
again stepping in and telling them what they can and cannot do.
As one police commissioner stated: "It's gotten to where now the
police can't do anything."" Police representatives have also ex-
pressed concern over the effect restrictions on pre-trial disclosures
will have in reducing public awareness of the crime problem.60
Police opposition is likely to increase in the future if and when
5d. at 14-15 (Standard 4.1 (a)). The Sheppard opinion is replete with examples
of stories and statements published during the trial which were reasonably calculated
to affect the outcome of the trial. See Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 345-49
(1966). However, Mr. Justice Clark, who wrote the opinion, did not urge direct use
of the contempt power, suggesting instead that a warning by the trial judge would have
sufficed: "Had the judge, the other officers of the court, and the police placed the in-
terest of justice first, the news media would have soon learned to be content with the
task of reporting the case as it unfolded in the courtroom - not pieced together from
extra-judicial statements." Id. at 362.56 See answers to questionnaires by fourteen metropolitan newspaper editors printed
in N.Y. Times, Oct. 9, 1966, p. 89, cols. 2-7.
57 Statement attributed to Judge George C. Edwards, Jr., United States Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, as quoted in N.Y. Times, Oct. 4, 1966, p. 26, col. 1.
58 11 ABANEws No. 12,at 3 (Dec. 15, 1966).
59 Statement of East St. Louis, Illinois, Police Commissioner Russell T. Beebe,
quoted in N.Y. Times, Oct. 5, 1966, p. 43, col. 2.60 Statement of Metuchen, New Jersey, Police Chief Edward F. Leiss, quoted in
N.Y. Times, Oct. 5, 1966, p. 43, col. 2.
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the proposals are ever put into effect. Under the proposed stand-
ards crime reporting is likely to shift its attention from the efforts
of the police in solving the crime and arresting the suspect to the
prosecutor's role in securing the conviction.
B. The Bar
Most members of the bar have remained silent and presumably
have listened to the criticism of others, but a few have spoken on
the merits of restraining lawyers.
F. Lee Bailey asserted, "We have no need of restraints such as
have been suggested by the American Bar Association, a panel
headed by a Justice of my own Supreme Court of Massachusetts,
with whose recommendations I hasten to disagree."'" When
pressed by a question as to whAt specifically in the recommenda-
tions he disagreed with, Bailey responded in part:
I don't disagree with specific parts; I disagree with the sugges-
tion that the press be shackled to any extent or that lawyers are to
be barred from talking about those parts of a criminal case which
will not be harmful to the defendant. And the recommendations,
if they become the rule, are far too general. A great deal of dis-
cretion must be left to responsible members of the Bar as to what
they may say because it may be of great importance to the de-
fendant that the truth come out.62
Mr. Bailey's assertion that discretion should and can be left to
"responsible members of the Bar as to what they may say" is not
borne out by experience.6"
But disregarding recent examples of irresponsibility by individ-
ual lawyers, can any defense lawyer realistically expect the courts to
muzzle the police without also muzzling members of the bar? Since
Bailey apparently advocates restrictions on police disclosure,6" his
rejection of restrictions on disclosures by lawyers is both unfair and
unworkable.
In a similar vein, Judge George C. Edwards, Jr. released a state-
ment sharply criticizing the ABA Report and asserting:
61 Address by F. Lee Bailey, supra note 47.
62 Ibid.
63 See, e.g., KAPLAN & WA.tZ, TRIAL OF JACK RUBY 81 (1965). For an incred-
ible account of how a writer, engaged by Belli to write a definitive book on the Ruby
trial, left Belli before trial because his book was being overshadowed by a planned tele-
vision documentary inspired by Belli and because he was not getting much more infor-
mation than the working press who also had unlimited access to Beli and his strategy,
see id. at 57.
64 See Address by F. Lee Bailey, supra note 47. In his address Bailey asserted that
police and prosecutors should be precluded from making pre-trial disclosures about
confessions, matters of evidence, and opinions as to guilt or the merits of the case.
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But there is another great concern. Lawyers traditionally the
most useful controversionalists in our nation's history, can be muz-
zled by the amendment of the Canon of Ethics. And if they are,
a mighty factor would be removed from what Holmes called "our
free market place of ideas.65
This statement, coupled with Judge Edwards' later allusion to
Clarence Darrow's great debate on freedom of education immedi-
ately preceding the 1925 trial of John T. Scopes,66 suggests a dis-
tinction between types of criminal trials. In the usual criminal
trial, the primary concern is the fact-determining process: Did or did
not the defendant commit the offense for which he is charged?
Since the outcome of this type of trial usually carries enormous con-
sequences for the defendant and his liberty, the primary concern is
the fairness and integrity of the fact-determining process, and, as
far as humanly possible, this process should not be contaminated
by outside influences. In another type of criminal trial, however,
both the fact-determining process itself and the outcome of that
process, the jury verdict, is relatively unimportant as far as the indi-
vidual defendant is concerned. In the Scopes trial, for example,
the factual issue of Scopes' teaching evolution in the classroom was
conceded by the defense, and Scopes was not faced with imprison-
ment in the event of a finding of guilty." Yet, almost everyone
was concerned as to whether Darwinism or Genesis was the true
doctrine and whether a state could prohibit the teaching of evolu-
tion in the classroom.
The problem, of course, is the impossibility of devising stand-
ards which recognize the distinction between these two classes of
trials.6" Since the first type of trial occurs far more frequently than
the second, it is important to muzzle the grandstand lawyer even if
65 N.Y. Times, Oct. 4, 1966, p. 26, col. 2.
66 Id. col. 4.
67 See Keebler, Limitations Upon the State's Control of Public Education: A Critical
Analysis of State of Tennessee v. John Thomas Scopes, 6 TENN. L REV. 153 (1928).
The Tennessee anti-evolution act under which Scopes was charged carried a maximum
penalty of a five hundred-dollar fine. Scopes was actually fined one hundred dollars
after the jury found him guilty.
68 During the last three years, this writer has participated in several trials, all of
them in the misdemeanor courts, where the principles involved were believed to be far
more important than either the factual determination or the outcome as it affected the
defendant. See, e.g., State v. McLaughlin, 4 Ohio App. 2d 327, 212 N.E.2d 635 (1965).
In McLaughlin, the defendant was found guilty by a jury of contributing to the delin-
quency of a minor because she had counseled her teenage daughter, whom she knew
to be promiscuous, about birth control. The issues raised - free speech, right of pri-
vacy, right of a parent to educate her child - evoked considerable public debate pending
the outcome of the appeal. Yet, the defendant, after her conviction, was placed on
inactive probation and was hardly concerned about what happened thereafter.
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it means muzzling the great debater. Furthermore, the proposed
standards impose a blackout on certain facts, not ideas or principles,
and any member of the bar other than those engaged in the trial
itself, is free to speak out on those principles before trial without
violating any of the standards.
C. The Press
Generally, the press has had no quarrel with those portions of
the proposed standards which restrict comment by members of
the bar engaged to try the case69 and with those portions which
strengthen existing remedies available to the defense for avoiding
potential prejudice.7" The press has, however, mounted an increas-
ingly intensified attack upon those standards which restrict disclo-
sure of certain types of information by police officers, arguing that
such restrictions obstruct the public's right to know and constitute
an unwarranted usurpation of authority by the courts over law en-
forcement officers who represent the public.7 '
Disregarding the long-standing question of whether the right
to gather news is protected by the first amendment along with the
right to print the news, this assertion overlooks two important facts.
First, law enforcement officers have traditionally withheld certain
information from the press and the public, primarily because the
prosecution has been reluctant to tip its hand to the defense. Sec-
ond, the pre-trial blackout is not like a blackout by the federal gov-
ernment on the release of classified information but is only tempo-.
rary.72 After the verdict or disposition by plea, the press is free to
6 9 A brief of the American Newspaper Publisher Association asserts: "In respect
to suggested restrictions by Bar associations on their own members, this Committee feels
that this is a matter of decision for the Bar itself." ANPA REPORT 9.
A spokesman for the American Society of Newspaper Editors asserted in comment-
ing recently on the New York Bar's Medina Report: 'We have no quarrel with efforts
to subdue public statements by counsel that are calculated to interfere with fair trial.
However, we think it is neither necessary nor proper to shut off virtually all communica-
tions between attorneys or public officers and the press before or during trial." N.Y.
Times, Feb. 24, 1967, p. 18, col. 5.
70 The ANPA Report discusses at some length existing remedies available to the
defense, such as change of venue, jury sequestration, and voir dire, in support of its
contention that existing remedies are adequate and new restrictions are not necessary.
ANPA REPORT 38-40.
71 The Association stated: "It is quite dear that freedom of the press means the
right to gather, to print, and to circulate information. Any judicial restraint of that
right at any point constitutes a prior governmental restraint. It is, in fact, censorship
at the source when judges, by court order, prohibit law enforcement officers of the
public from providing information to the public." Id. at 3.
72 As the chairman of the ABA Advisory Committee on Fair Trial and Free Press,
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interview police and prosecutor who are then under no restrictions
whatsoever. Granted, this postponed right to gather news which
is old may not satisfy a press struggling for increased circulation,
but it does mitigate the theoretical argument respecting the public's
right to know.
The second prong of the attack against restrictions on police
disclosure is based upon the doctrine of separation of powers and
raises a serious question." Traditionally, the courts have confined
their sanctions to regulating their courtrooms and prohibiting evi-
dence acquired by abusive practices from being introduced in a
courtroom trial."4 It is almost unthinkable for a court to punish
directly a law enforcement officer for allegedly seizing evidence or
eliciting an involuntary confession unless an order or injunction
against such abuse has first been issued and directed to a specific
law enforcement officer,"5 or unless such abuse is so flagrant as to
constitute an offense under some existing statute." The ABA
standards which seek to restrict pre-trial disclosures by law enforce-
ment officers and which are proposed for adoption as rules of court
are aimed indiscriminately at all law enforcement officers subject
to the rule-making court's jurisdiction and cover disclosures which
are neither flagrant nor prohibited by existing laws.
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court Judge Paul Reardon asserted after the first week
of intense reaction to the report:
Rather, the committee has attempted to formulate restrictions on the re-
lease of information by lawyers and law enforcement officials that are care-
fully limited as to both content and timing, for it is the committee's view
that the question is not whether certain disclosures may be made but when.
It is the "when" that will be crucial in . . . [assuring] that both the accused
and his accusers will obtain a fair trial by an impartial jury. Quoted in N.Y.
Times, Oct. 16, 1966, p. 82, cols. 1, 4.
73 Again, as the brief of the American Newspaper Publishers Association asserts:
The Committee states that it is a matter of public concern when court
orders place restrictions on law enforcement officers in the release of informa-
tion. Such action could easily lead to judicial domination of the executive
branch of government, and may well be an invasion which would threaten
the historically honored separation of powers and responsibilities. ANPA
REPORT 7-8.
74 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Mapp v. Ohio, 376 U.S. 643 (1961).
75 In Rea v. United States, 350 U.S. 214 (1956), the Supreme Court sustained an
application to enjoin a federal law enforcement officer from testifying in a state crimi-
nal trial following a determination by a federal court that a search conducted by the
narcotics agent required application of the exclusionary rule in federal court. Id. at
217. In Lankford v. Gelston, 364 F.2d 197 (4th Cit. 1966), the Fourth Circuit issued
a broader order against the entire Baltimore Police Department enjoining members of
the department "from conducting a search of any private house to effect the arrest of
any person not known to reside therein, whether with or without an arrest warrant,
where the belief that the person is on the premises is based only on an anonymous tip
and hence without probable cause." Id. at 206.
76 E.g., Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945).
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Nonetheless, the ABA Committee deliberately rejected execu-
five regulation or legislative enactment as a means of restricting
disclosures by law enforcement officers in favor of rules of court
"because the matter falls properly within the judicial sphere and
because use of the rule making power permits greater flexibility
whenever the need for change is demonstrated."77  While the Com-
mittee did not so expressly state in the Report, it may also have
noted the difficulty of persuading elected legislators to enact stat-
utes or elected executives to adopt regulations in the face of ex-
pected intense press opposition.
In anticipation of the separation of powers attack, the Commit-
tee has marshalled an effective brief in rebuttal.78 Yet, it remains
to be determined whether the courts, and particularly the state
courts, will agree with the Committee's conclusions. It may be
necessary for some states to enact contempt statutes permitting
punishment of one who is in "disobedience or resistance to its [the
court's] lawful writ, process, order, rule, decree, or command 79
before state courts can invoke their contempt powers to punish rule
violations.
While press criticism of other segments of the ABA standards
has been less vocal, press opposition to these other provisions can
be expected to continue.
At the outset, newspaper editors termed the provisions for closed
hearings as a license to reinstate Star Chamber proceedings with
both secret arrest and trial."0 After study of the dosed hearing
provisions and the safeguards they hold for individual defendants,
the press turned its attention from the tights of the defendant to
the rights of the public to be present through the news media at
all phases of the trial, including pre-trial hearings. In short, the
right to a public trial exists for the benefit of the public as well as
77 ABA RnPORT 102 (commentary).
78 Id. at 102-07.
The report of the New York City Bar Association's Medina Committee reached an
opposite conclusion
The Committee is firmly of the opinion that the courts lack any power
-whatsoever over the police or the news media during the first stage of the
pretrial period, except the ever present power to control activities in and
around the courthouse.... Furthermore, as to the police, we find no author-
ity inherent in the courts or the judges to discipline them for alleged breach
of their duties as police officers. MEDINA REPORT 40.
70 18 U.S.C. § 401 (1964). This device is discussed in ABA REPORT 106 (com-
mentary).
80 N.Y. Times, Oct. 9, 1966, p. 89, col. 2. See comments of editors of Des Moines
Register and Tribune, New York Times, and St. Louis Post-Dispatch in New York Times'
poll of major newspaper editors. Ibid.
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of the defendant.81 Whether the sixth amendment guarantee that
"in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy and public trial" justifies such an interpretation has never
been fully clarified by the courts. However, the press has argued
with some success in state courts that equivalent state constitutional
provisions inure to the benefit of the public as well as the defend-
ant." The press will most certainly litigate this issue whenever
and wherever the standards are put into effect.8" Defenders of the
standards will answer that the right to a public trial must in certain
limited circumstances temporarily yield to the right to a trial by
an impartial jury.
In addition, the press will certainly contest any use of the con-
tempt power over newspapers directly, whether resort to such power
purports to safeguard closed hearings or to prevent extrajudicial
statements reasonably calculated to affect the outcome of the trial
and which seriously threaten to have such an effect. Very re-
cently the press has won significant victories in asserting first amend-
ment rights in the fields of libel, defamation, and right of privacy.'
In the area of resort to judicial contempt powers to insure fair trials,
a New York City Bar group, which studied the fair trial and free
press problem at the same time as did the ABA Committee, has
already asserted that first amendment rights are paramount.8 5
'Again, in anticipating this problem, the ABA Committee has
carefully circumscribed judicial contempt powers with an eye to
existing Supreme Court decisions.86 One example of this caution is
8 1 The brief of the American Newspaper Publishers Association asserted: "Criminal
trials are required by the sixth amendment to be 'public.' Although the Constitution
confers this right to the accused, he cannot waive the right and thereby bar the public
from his trial." ANPA REPORT 125. This assertion appears in the report's critique
of Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965), which held that televising a public trial vio-
lated defendant's rights to due process of law.
82 For different holdings on this question, see cases discussed in ABA REPORT 116-
17 (commentary).
83 See Phoenix Newspapers, Inc. v. Superior Court, 418 P.2d 594 (Ariz. 1966). In
this case the newspapers obtained a writ of prohibition against the trial court's proceed-
ing with a contempt action against the newspapers for reporting the outcome of a
habeas corpus hearing conducted just before the beginning of a first-degree murder
trial. See also In re Shaw, No. 16942, Super. Ct. Mass., Nov. 4, 1966, where a reporter
was adjudged in contempt of court and fined one hundred dollars for publishing a
ruling of the trial judge on a pretrial motion to suppress evidence in violation of a
court order requested by the defense.
84 E.g., Time, Inc. v. Hill, 87 Sup. Ct. 534 (1967) (New York right of privacy
suit against Life magazine); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964)
(Alabama defamation suit against New York Times).
85 N.Y. Times, Feb. 24, 1967, p. 18, col. 1.
86 The general contempt power conferred by the proposed standards, as opposed
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the requirement of proving at least an implied intent as to extra-
judicial statements made during trial. Such statements must be
reasonably calculated to affect the outcome of the trial. This re-
quirement approximates the requirement in defamation and right
of privacy cases where intent, express or implied, to make false
statements must also be proven."7
IV. Two PROBLEMS UNDER THE PROPOSED
ABA STANDARDS
Police disclosures reported in the press are a major source of
pre-trial discovery available to defense counsel, for what the police
will tell the press they will not tell the opposing lawyer. Although
such disclosures are limited, they frequently suggest other sources
which the defense can tap for discovery purposes. In this way de-
fense counsel in jurisdictions where no formal discovery procedure
is available are able in some instances to learn what evidence in the
possession of the prosecution the defense must be prepared to meet
at trial, or if such evidence cannot be met, to attempt to negotiate a
guilty plea. A pre-trial blackout such as that proposed in the ABA
recommended standards will virtually wipe out this informal source
of pre-trial information.
In the federal jurisdiction the expansion of formal pre-trial dis-
covery as provided in the recently amended rules of federal criminal
procedure materially reduces this new discovery problem.8" How-
ever, many states do not provide equivalent pre-trial discovery pro-
cedures. Thus a problem which is already intolerable will be fur-
ther aggravated in these states by adoption of the recommended
standards unless the scope of pre-trial discovery is expanded.
A second problem concerns the protection of even the most
vicious defendant from what sometimes can only be termed the
to the narrow contempt power associated with the power to conduct dosed hearings, is
limited to statements which are made during the trial only for mass media dissemina-
tion. In Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375 (1962), criticism by an elected sheriff of a
court's charge to a grand jury investigating the bribery of Negro voters by certain pub-
lic officials was held to be protected by the first amendment, and a contempt conviction
was reversed. The Court suggested it might be a different matter if at the time the
statement was made an individual was on trial or a judicial proceeding pending. Id. at
389-90.
87In Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964), the conviction of a New Orleans
district attorney for criminal libel was reversed because under existing Louisiana libel
law the state was not required to adduce proof of actual malice or implied malice -
"that is, [that a statement was made) with knowledge that it was false or with reckless
disregard of whether it was false or not." Id. at 67. See also Time, Inc. v. Hill, 87 Sup.
Ct. 534, 541 (1967); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964).
88 ED. R. CIuM. P. 16.
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cruel excesses of an outraged community. Granted, the United
States Constitution does not guarantee a humane trial as it guaran-
tees a trial before an impartial jury; and, granted, no judicial deci-
sion has equated the two. Nonetheless, this problem is of increas-
ing concern to lawyers as well as to newsmen.s9
This problem arises not only in trials of national interest but
also in proceedings of only local concern which frequently are con-
cluded by disposition without trial. The writer has witnessed a
young woman seated in the defendant's chair in the courtroom,
head down, surrounded by flashbulbs and television cameras. This
moment of exposure occurred but seconds before the judge returned
to the bench to sentence this woman to prison for the first time in
her life for the offense of allowing her child to starve to death.
Not long ago in this community a twenty-two-year-old parolee
was arrested for kidnapping and sexually molesting a seven-year-
old girl. ° The young man was interviewed before microphones
by reporters and photographed at the police station;91 his lawyer
appeared on a television newscast; his parents pleaded in the news
media for understanding.92 The young offender was placed in a
solitary cell presumably for his own protection. A few weeks later
he was found dead, hanging by a sheet." Who knows why the
young man took his life - perhaps because he was all alone to
face the horrible realization of how his community regarded him?
While the ABA Report nowhere focuses on this problem of
humane criminal proceedings, the Committee does suggest a partial
remedy in its recommendations that law enforcement authorities
adopt regulations prohibiting:
(i) the deliberate posing of a person in custody for photograph-
ing or televising by representatives of the news media and (ii)
the interviewing by representatives of the news media of a per-
son in custody unless he requests an interview in writing after
being adequately informed of his right to consult with counsel 94
The purported safeguards in this recommendation are not strong
enough. A defendant or a defendant's lawyer can be cajoled by
newsmen or police into permitting such an interview. The prohi-
89 See generally KAPLAN & WALTZ, op. cit. supra note 63, at 370.
9 0 Cleveland Plain Dealer, Jan. 25, 1965, p. 1, col. 1.
91 Cleveland Plain Dealer, Jan. 26, 1965, p. 1, col. 3, p. 8, cols. 1-8.
92 Cleveland Plain Dealer, Jan. 25, 1965, p. 1, col. 1.
93 Cleveland Plain Dealer, Feb. 17, 1965, p. 29, col. 1.
9 4 ABA REPORT 7 (Standard 2.2(b)).
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bition must be absolute, as urged by Dean Griswold95 and as rec-
ommended in the New York City Bar group's Recommended Code
for Police and Law Enforcement Agencies. That code states: "News
media shall not be permitted to interview the defendant, with or
without his attorney's consent, while he is in police custody." 6
Furthermore, it is unfortunate that these ABA standards are
relegated to the status of recommended executive regulation rather
than court rule. If the courts have power at all to regulate police
conduct by resort to contempt proceedings, then the courts have
power to regulate police conduct in this sphere as well as in those
spheres which bear more directly on the problem of insuring a fair
trial before an impartial jury. A defendant who claims prejudice
before a jury has a variety of remedies upon which to rely. A de-
fendant who is subjected to camera and interview exposure may
look only to the protection of the courts' contempt powers if he
elects to forego a jury trial.
V. CONCLUSION
The ABA recommendations have encountered vigorous oppo-
sition because they are strong and effective. Even those recom-
mendations which have not been publicly criticized - the new
standards governing motions for change of venue and for impaneling
a jury - will encounter silent opposition, namely, the reluctance of
the courts to spend additional time and expense to insure an impar-
tial jury. Realistically, the ABA Committee has recognized that
this additional expense must be reduced as far as possible by direct
restrictions upon the police and bar so that conditions requiring a
change of venue or jury sequestration will not frequently occur.
In proposing that these restrictions be enforced by the recogni-
tion and exercise of the judiciary's contempt power, the ABA Re-
port has stirred a controversy even beyond that which the Com-
mittee itself may have expected. Implicit in the recommendations
95 It... [should] be made plain to... [law enforcement officers] that they
are officers of the law and that it is their sworn duty to protect the defendant
against outside pressures as well as to hold him in custody. It may be their
duty to confine him, but they should dearly understand that that duty carries
with it the responsibility to see that he is not forced to make statements to
anyone, that he is not subjected to interviews in which he does not wish to
participate, and that he need not have his picture taken if he does not want it
taken .... Griswold, When Newsmen Become Newsmakers, Saturday Re-
view, Oct. 24, 1964, p. 21, at 23.
9 6 MEDINA REPORT 33. A flat rule would protect the non-consenting defendant
from retaliation by the news media in the form of editorial comment upon the defend-
ants refusal to permit interviewing and photographing.
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of this Report is the conclusion that voluntary codes between the
press and bar are not enough,9" that the bar must put its own house
in order and have the courage to do the job effectively."8
If the ABA Report is approved by the American Bar Associa-
tion," an enormous task lies ahead in implementing its recom-
mendations. Local trial judges must be persuaded to agree upon
and adopt rules of court; state statutes authorizing challenge for
cause of prospective jurors must be revised; and even interstate com-
pacts respecting changes of venue may be required. Protracted
litigation on key contempt provisions is a virtual certainty. Mean-
while, the ABA Report provides a rich variety of source material
which defense lawyers may utilize in their efforts to persuade the
courts to adopt new remedies that will ensure impartial jury trials.
97 Some representatives of the press also disfavor adoption of voluntary codes: "In
the early stages of the study the most often recommended course for the press by the
Bar was the adoption of codes of conduct. Such a course must be rejected. From a
practical standpoint any such codes would be without value because there is no way to
enforce them." ANPA REZPORT 8. See also id. app. D. for examples of codes and
statements of principles adopted by the press and bar in some states; Statement of Prin-
ciples and Standards adopted by Cleveland Bar Association and Cleveland Plain Dealer,
March 22, 1966. Cleveland Plain Dealer, March 23, 1966, p. 1, col. 2.
9 8 Both the ABA Advisory Committee and some segments of the press have ex-
pressed willingness to continue discussions on the problem of fair trial and free press.
12 ABA NEws, Feb. 15, 1967, p. 6. See also editorial in N.Y. Times, Feb. 26, 1967,
E , p. 10, col. 3.
9 9 The ABA Report must be considered by the ABA Sections of Criminal Law
and Judicial Administration before it can be recommended to the ABA House of Dele-
gates which is scheduled for February 1968. ABA REPORT vi; 12 ABA NEWS, Feb.
15, 1967, p. 6. In addition to the ABA Report and the Medint Report, another com-
mittee, chaired by United States Court of Appeals Judge Irving R. Kaufman, is expected
to report to the Judicial Conference of the United States in March 1967 on the problem
of prejudicial publicity as affecting juries in the federal courts. N.Y. Times, Oct. 7,
1966, p. 1, col. 5, p. 31, col. 1.
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